Search results

We investigate how firing notification procedures influence wage growth. Using a sample of 33 countries over the period 2006–2015, we show that administrative requirements in cases of dismissal have a positive and significant effect on wage growth. The result is robust even after controlling for the endogeneity of the firing notification restrictions, the involvement of third parties in the wage bargaining process, the minimum wage, the firms' training policy, and the composition of employment. These findings suggest that firing notification procedures foster the growth of wages by increasing the bargaining power of incumbent workers.

This paper uses two complementary approaches to estimate the effect of right-to-work (RTW) laws on wages and unionization rates. The first approach uses an event study design to analyze the impact of the adoption of RTW laws in five US states since 2011. The second approach relies on a differential exposure design that exploits the differential impact of RTW laws on industries with high unionization rates relative to industries with low unionization rates. Both approaches indicate that RTW laws lower wages and unionization rates. Under the assumption that RTW laws only affect wages by lowering the unionization rate, RTW can be used as an instrumental variable (IV) to estimate the causal effect of unions on wages. In our preferred specification based on the differential exposure design, the IV estimate of the effect of unions on log wages is 0.35, which substantially exceeds the corresponding OLS estimate of 0.16. This large wage effect suggests that RTW may also directly affect wages due to a reduced union threat effect.

Using data from the 2013 European Company Survey, this chapter operationalizes the representation gap as the desire for greater employee involvement in decision-making expressed by the representative of the leading employee representative body at the workplace. According to this measure, there is evidence of a substantial shortfall in employee involvement in the European Union, not dissimilar to that reported for the United States. The chapter proceeds to investigate how the size of this representation gap varies by type of representative structure, information provided by management, the resource base available to the representatives, and the status of trust between the parties. Perceived deficits are found to be smaller where workplace representation is via works councils rather than union bodies. Furthermore, the desire for greater involvement is reduced where information provided the employee representative on a range of establishment issues is judged satisfactory. A higher frequency of meetings with management also appears to mitigate the expressed desire for greater involvement. Each of these results is robust to estimation over different country clusters. However, unlike the other arguments, the conclusion that shortfalls in employee involvement representation are smaller under works councils than union bodies is nullified where trust in management is lacking.

This paper examines the role of cultural values measured as collectivism, face-saving, and conflict-avoidance, in predicting employee voice behavior. Using data (n = 198) collected from automotive-industry employees in the United States (US) and Korea, several interesting findings emerged. First, and most notably, for a “leaver” who chooses the exit option, culture does not matter, such that none of the three cultural values have a significant association with the exit option across countries. Second, for a “stayer,” who chooses the voice, loyalty, or neglect option, culture does matter in that cultural-specific values, such as collectivism, face-saving, and conflict-avoidance were found to affect employees nonexit options in the Korean sample, but not in the U.S. sample. The results of this study suggest that these three cultural values guide and predict employee voice behavior. Additionally, the results of this study confirm that job alternatives are a significant predictor of the exit option across cultures. This study therefore presents strong empirical evidence of the effect of culture on employee voice behavior and increases our understanding of employee voice behavior across cultures.

In this chapter, we propose a theoretical assessment of the relationship between unions and investments. We develop a simple model where a firm chooses its investment level anticipating the employee's effort choice and the outcome of wage bargaining. First, and consistently with the holdup view, we find that the union's bargaining power has a negative effect on the accumulation of fixed capital. Second, we show that this negative effect is mitigated by the voice ability of unions to ease the displeasure of exerting effort. Hence, when the voice ability of unions is strong vis-à-vis their bargaining power, the holdup view does not necessarily survive, and unionized firms invest more than their nonunionized competitors.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of key labor institutions on the occurrence and extent of temporary employment.

In a new departure, this study uses a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model given that most establishments are non-users of either fixed-term contracts (FTCs) or temporary agency workers.

This study examines the potential impact of works councils and unions on the use and intensity of use of FTCs and temporary agency work. There is a little indication that these variables are correlated with the use/non-use of either type of temporary work, especially in the case of FTCs. Collective bargaining displays different relationships with their intensity of use: a negative association for sectoral bargaining and FTCs and the converse for firm-level bargaining and agency temps. Of more interest, however, is the covariation between the number of temporary employees and the interaction between works councils and product market volatility. The intensity of use of agency temps (FTCs) is predicted to rise (fall) as volatility increases whenever a works council is present. These disparities require further investigation but most likely reflect differences in function, with agency work being more directed toward the protection of an arguably shrinking core and fixed-term contacts encountering resistance to their increased use as a buffer stock. The two types of temporary employment are seemingly non-complementary, an interpretation that receives support from the study’s further analysis of FTC flow data.

The non-complementarity of the two types of contract is the hallmark of this paper.

The first study to deploy a ZINB model to examine both the occurrence and incidence of temporary work.

Pain is demonstrated as a complex, multi-dimensional phenomenon that is interdependent and connected between people. The author proposes that social scientists use a “total model” of pain to better understand pain epistemologically and ontologically and people’s “pain lives.” Through this model, and drawing from the author’s own research on mixed martial artists, new ways to conceptualize, study, and talk about pain within the sporting context have been outlined.

In the first part of this chapter, pain is discussed with respect to how it has been researched and understood within the fields of medicine, sport psychology, and the sociology of sport. In the second part of this chapter, the total pain model developed by Dame Cicely Saunders is explored as a revolutionary development for the ways in which pain is understood and treated within the health field. Lastly, the author proposes a reconstructed methodology for the study of pain.

Pain should be studied not from one tradition, but using an amalgamation of the medical, sport psychology, and sociology of sport traditions and perspectives. In this way, the many dimensions of the phenomenon, social, cultural, political, material/physical, spiritual, existential, emotional, and cognitive must be explored from all systems and languages of pain in order to achieve a more robust understanding of pain in sport.

The dualistic relationship between theory and method currently present in most qualitative research does not fully account for the complexity of bodies in pain. Therefore, it is critical to adopt an interwoven methodological and theoretical approach that enables scholars to relate to, and feel with, people in pain.

The aim of the paper is to investigate the effect of labor strength on stock price crash risk and related moderating mechanisms.

To examine the relationship between labor unions and stock price crash risk and, more importantly, whether corporate governance moderates this relationship. Ordinary least squares (OLS), two-stage least squares, cross-sectional analyses, industry-level regressions and firm-level regressions are conducted.

The results suggest a negative impact of labor union strength on stock price crash risk. Further analysis suggests strong corporate governance mechanisms may mitigate the increased stock price crash risk in less-unionized firms.

Labor unions have a long-term horizon in the firm and have strong incentives to monitor managerial opportunism. However, labor unions may also increase financial reporting opacity and collude with managers to gain bargaining power in labor negotiations. The authors’ finding suggests that labor union strength is negatively associated with stock price crash risk. This finding is consistent with the notion that labor unions curb managerial opportunism in information disclosure, resulting in reduced crash risk. More importantly, the authors find corporate governance mitigates the negative impact of reduced unionization on crash risk, providing empirical support for recent regulatory efforts to strengthen corporate governance to prevent stock market crash.

Within the two-tier bargaining system, the role of complementary collective bargaining is somewhat controversial. In this paper, the authors analyse collective agreements from a triple perspective: scanning the contents of firm-level complementary collective agreements (CCAs); identifying the factors that determine the probability of signing a CCA and analysing the relationship between the latter and firm performance with a focus on the role of different negotiated topics.

The empirical procedure is based on 2 main linked sources: longitudinal balance sheet data and a cross-sectional dataset of a representative sample of Italian firms with at least 15 employees, including some retrospective information. The innovative dataset derives from integrating multiple sources. The main empirical approaches include Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimations, multivariate regressions, as well as instrumental variable (IV) estimations to overcome simultaneity issues.

With respect to the probability of signing a CCA, on the firms' side, the authors find a positive role of the degree of firm capitalisation and affiliation with an employers' association and a negative role of family firms compared to non-family firms; on the workers' side, a positive role of the workers' unionisation rate and a positive but differentiated weight of workers' union representations and industrial conflicts. With regard to firm performance, the authors' estimates suggest that signing a CCA is associated with an average increase of 3% in total factor productivity (TFP) and 7.8% in labour productivity. By investigating the contents of the complementarity agreements, the authors show that bargaining a wider range of topics implies advantages that are not homogenous, benefitting more efficient firms. Moreover, the authors find a specific positive and significant role for three main interacting issues: economic incentives, organisation and employment.

The cross-sectional structure of the data on bargaining practices prevents detecting causal relationships due to either potential common driver(s) of both the target variables (firm performance) and bargaining practices (simultaneity bias) and unobservable time-invariant firm-level characteristics (heterogeneity bias).

According to the authors' results, policymakers should operate along four fiscal channels to spur the efficiency of firms, via CCA. First, tax incentives stimulate higher firm capitalisation, as this seems to be a CCA-favouring factor. Second, deduction in taxable income for union members, which should led to higher membership rates, hence raising the likelihood of obtaining a CCA. Third, incentives aimed at directly promoting the greater diffusion of CCAs as a source of improved performance. Fourth, fiscal tools aimed at favouring the negotiation of either specific contents or “bundles” of contents, which the authors' estimates show as an additional performance-enhancing tool of CCA practices.

The conceptualisation of the contents of CCA as organisational investments and the whole probability function of signing a CCA are quite innovative. Moreover, the econometric strategy takes account of several potential sources of bias when estimating the relevant coefficients at each stage, which is currently not fully considered in the literature. Finally, this is the first study to shed light on both the diverse outcomes associated with different negotiated topics (in terms of quantity and quality) and the distinction between short and medium-long term effects.

In neo‐classical economic theory labour is a commodity and the ultimate value of the employer's services is determined by the sales value of the product of these services: the cost of supply reflects both the disutility of work for the recruit and his equalisation of net advantages between jobs. For modern labour economists the assumption that entrepreneurs require identical inputs of labour and the new recruits will therefore possess similar skills (the conditions of free competition) is an unrealistic one. Hence segmental labour market theory has grown out of the need to explain differences between shared needs and commonalities within each group of consumers (employers) on the one hand and suppliers (employees) on the other. In this way it has been possible to carry on assuming the existence of perfect competition on both sides of the market within the boundaries of labour markets thus defined.